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ADEQUATELY REPRESENTING GROUPS 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch* 
INTRODUCTION 
Adequate representation and preclusion, the yin and yang of procedural 
due process, depend on whether the courts treat a litigant as part of a group 
experiencing an aggregate harm or as a distinct person suffering individual 
injuries.  And though a vast literature about adequate representation exists 
in the class-action context,1 it thins dramatically when contemplating other 
forms of group litigation, such as parens patriae actions and multidistrict 
litigation (MDL).2  Yet, the need for adequate representation is ubiquitous.  
Any time one person seeks to represent another in litigation, two questions 
arise:  Is the representative relationship itself legitimate and, if so, are the 
representative’s decisions and actions adequate?  Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides ready answers to both questions.  
Certifying a class legitimizes the attorney and class representative’s 
relationship with the class members and requiring a judge to approve a 
settlement confirms that the representative’s actions were fair and 
reasonable.3  But as class actions have gradually fallen into disfavor4 and 
 
*  Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  My thanks to Howard 
Erichson, Sam Issacharoff, Nancy Moore, Ben Zipursky, and participants of Fordham 
University School of Law’s Symposium on Lawyering for Groups:  Civil Rights, Mass 
Torts, and Everything in Between for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. E.g., David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson:  A 
Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279 
(2006); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class 
Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1852–59 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due 
Process, and the Right To Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2002); 
Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously:  The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in 
Litigation and Settlement Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687 (2004); Jay Tidmarsh, 
Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2009); Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005); Patrick 
Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571 (1997). 
 2. There are a few notable exceptions such as Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation 
Goes Public:  Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 
(2012); Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict 
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985 (2011); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations:  Problems and a 
Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010). 
 3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (e).  Judges certify a class based on the commonality and 
typicality of members’ claims such that if a class representative selfishly pursues her own 
interest, the fruits of her labor will inure to absent class members. 
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attorneys and commentators seek alternative means for resolving group 
harms, the relative clarity of Rule 23 wanes.  How should courts evaluate 
adequate representation in parens patriae actions and in multidistrict 
litigation?  The answer to this question matters immensely since adequate 
representation is critical to precluding relitigation and achieving finality. 
This Article suggests that courts should differentiate between inadequate 
representation claims based on the underlying right at stake.  When the 
underlying right arises from an aggregate harm—a harm that affects a group 
of people equally and collectively—and demands an indivisible remedy, 
courts should tolerate greater conflicts among group members when 
evaluating a subsequent claim of inadequate representation.  Because the 
harm is aggregate and the remedy is indivisible (typically declaratory or 
injunctive relief), if one group member receives the remedy, then they all 
receive the remedy.  The litigation operates to group members’ benefit or 
detriment equally, so if one group member is inadequately represented, they 
are all inadequately represented.  Consequently, a subsequent litigant can 
successfully avoid preclusion only where the lawyers or the named 
representatives acted contrary to the group’s best interests or attempted to 
represent an overinclusive, noncohesive group where some members 
required unique relief that the representative had no selfish reason to 
pursue. 
Conversely, when plaintiffs suffer individual injuries at the same 
defendant’s hands and unite their claims for economic or efficiency reasons, 
that aggregation does not convert their individual injuries into an aggregate 
harm.  When counsel fails to fairly represent her client in vindicating that 
harm, inadequate representation is an individual injury.  In multidistrict 
litigation and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, which typically include 
individuals litigating their individual harms together for systematic and 
litigant efficiency, courts should look for “structural conflicts” between the 
claimants themselves as well as between the representatives and the 
claimants.  This means that both initially and on a collateral attack, courts 
should accept fewer conflicts than in cases involving aggregate rights.  
Accordingly, judges should assess whether there are reasons the lawyers 
“might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some 
claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their 
respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers 
themselves.”5 
This Article develops this aggregate-rights framework in three parts.  Part 
I begins with an overview of the consent and identity-of-interest theories 
that dominate representative litigation.  It concludes, however, that these 
theories fail to explain a number of situations that arise in mandatory 
 
 4. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013). 
 5. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a)(1) 
(2010). 
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litigation under parens patriae statutes or in Rule 23(b)(2) lawsuits, such as 
school-busing cases and Title IX litigation.  Part II.A contends that 
determining whether the initial underlying right at stake is an aggregate or 
individual harm better explains these results.  This part thus proposes an 
aggregate-rights framework for distinguishing between collective and 
individual rights and contends that the right to adequate representation is, 
likewise, a group or individual right.  Accordingly, courts should evaluate 
allegations concerning inadequate representation differently depending on 
whether the underlying substantive right being prosecuted is aggregate or 
individual. 
Parts II.B and II.C address two stumbling blocks in this aggregate-rights 
framework:  hybrid claims and procedural legitimacy.  First, because the 
aggregate-rights framework does not always impart easy answers, Part II.B 
takes up the knotty situation in which the underlying right is aggregate, but 
the remedies requested include individual, divisible relief.  Second, because 
courts accept greater intragroup conflicts in prosecuting collective rights, 
Part II.C aims to improve legitimacy in litigating aggregate harms by 
arguing that courts should send notice to affected absentees and allow them 
to comment on the proposed remedy.  Finally, Part III applies the 
aggregate-rights framework to parens patriae actions and multidistrict 
litigation. 
I.  ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH THE YEARS 
Adequate representation’s theoretical underpinnings are murky at best.  
In his historical work on the class action, Professor Stephen Yeazell 
identified two theories that explain when one person can represent another 
in litigation:  (1) when the absent litigant consents and (2) when the 
representative and absent litigant have overlapping interests.6  He contends 
that modern Rule 23 embodies both theories in odd respects, which only 
serves to confuse the doctrine: 
In situations in which the drafters of Rule 23 saw relatively little value in 
the interests likely to be represented in class litigation [such as negative-
value cases], the Rule requires individual notice as an index of interest, 
even though in many such situations there can be little doubt about where 
that interest lies.  At other times the Rule requires the court to ignore 
consent, perhaps because it might serve as an embarrassing reminder of 
conflicting interests . . . .7 
 
 6. Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part I:  The 
Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 514, 522 (1980) (“Sometimes it has 
been argued (or assumed) that treatment of the group as a group was appropriate because all 
members had consented to be treated so.  At other times the members’ consent has been 
thought to be unimportant because their identical ‘interests’ were being represented in the 
litigation.”). 
 7. Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II:  Interest, Class, 
and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1108 (1980). 
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Nevertheless, consent and identity of interests make sense in some cases.  
For example, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,8 the Supreme Court 
explained that the district court could not certify a global asbestos class 
action because the diverse class members had conflicting interests.9  Class 
representatives could not simultaneously represent presently injured 
plaintiffs and those with injuries that might materialize in the future.10  
Injured plaintiffs would want to receive the largest payout possible 
immediately, whereas those with injuries that could manifest in the future 
would want to preserve those funds to compensate them for injuries when 
and if they arose.11  Consent could not suffice either, even though the 
Supreme Court interpreted consent quite liberally in Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts.12  There, the Court held that class members who do not opt out of 
a Rule 23(b)(3) class have, in some amorphous way, consented to the 
representation.13  But, because the global asbestos class in Amchem 
included people who had simply been exposed to asbestos but had no 
perceptible injury, even this tenuous link to consent was not satisfied:  
exposure-only plaintiffs might not know of the exposure or might lack the 
information needed to decide whether to opt out.14 
Litigation initiated by a voluntary membership association also makes 
sense in terms of consent and identity of interests.  When people join an 
organization like a union or a homeowners association they tend to do so 
voluntarily (though they might face social pressure or limited housing 
opportunities that force their hand).  This strengthens the claims of consent.  
Plus, associations litigate only matters that relate to their organization; a 
labor union would not sue over homeowners association fees and 
homeowners associations would not sue to vindicate workers’ rights.  While 
opinions within the association may vary, differences can be hashed out 
within the organizational structure.  So, union or homeowners association 
members might vote on whether to litigate a particular matter and that 
decision would bind the body as a whole.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
courts preclude subsequent suits by individual members and hold that the 
association’s actions prevent them from relitigating.15 
 
 8. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 9. Id. at 626–27. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 627. 
 12. See 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985). 
 13. Id. at 812; see also Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1064–66; Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1148, 1168 (1998). 
 14. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628. 
 15. See, e.g., Bolden v. Pa. State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 918–19 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(precluding litigation by nonminority police officers where the fraternal order of police 
previously agreed to a consent decree); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425–26 (2d Cir. 
1978) (finding that, because the plaintiffs were previously represented by a property-owner’s 
association, they could not litigate a due-process issue); Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 
F.2d 1227, 1235–36 (2d Cir. 1977) (preventing members of a trade association from 
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But not all cases make sense in terms of consent or identity of interests.  
School desegregation and curfew cases provide a few good examples.  In 
Waters v. Barry,16 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged 
an 11:00 p.m. curfew that ordered all minors in the District of Columbia to 
be inside after that time.17  But many of the class members and their parents 
were not ACLU members and actually supported the curfew.18  They 
preferred to trade their First Amendment rights for public safety.19  But 
these conflicting interests did not prevent the court from certifying a Rule 
23(b)(2) non–opt out class.  Instead, the judge concluded that when a class 
of that size was involved, “differences of opinion are unavoidable,” but 
“diversity of opinion within a class does not defeat class certification.”20  
Further, the court reasoned that the class representative’s interests were not 
antagonistic to dissenting class members:  those members could still easily 
abide by the challenged curfew if they so chose—reasoning that seemed 
beside the point given the dissenters’ public-safety concerns.21 
The 1970s school desegregation cases faced similar problems:  though 
class members might all prefer to challenge a defendant’s conduct, they 
disagreed over what relief to request.22  Some wanted to improve local 
black schools, whereas others wanted integration.23  Still others were 
against forced school busing because it required sending their children to 
poor, but integrated schools and placed their children in violent situations.24  
Yet, despite these important disagreements, courts continued to certify 
mandatory class actions.25 
Title IX cases provide an even more recent example.  In Communities for 
Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n,26 the court recognized the 
possibility “that members of the class have no desire to pursue this action, 
and are not unhappy with the status quo.”27  Yet, it reasoned that the 
defendants would represent that dissenting contingent and that class 
members who prefer to remain victims cannot have a disqualifying conflict 
 
enjoining deregistration of a training program because the association was involved in 
previous litigation). 
 16. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 17. Id. at 1127. 
 18. See id. at 1131. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1963) (refusing to enjoin 
a segregated nursing home where no affected resident was a class member). 
 23. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and 
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471, 476–77 (1976). 
 24. See generally id. at 471; Leo Crowley, Due Process Rights of Absentees in Title VII 
Class Actions—The Myth of Homogeneity of Interest, 59 B.U. L. REV. 661, 666–80 (1979) 
(arguing that the divergent interests in Title VII cases cause inadequate representation). 
 25. See David Marcus, Making Adequacy More Adequate, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 137, 
142–43 (2009), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Marcus-88-TLRSA-137.pdf. 
 26. 192 F.R.D. 568 (W.D. Mich. 1999). 
 27. Id. at 574. 
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on that basis.28  Moreover, to the extent that certain sports would be 
competing with one another for resources, those conflicts went to the 
requested relief, not liability.29  Consequently, the court rationalized that it 
could designate subclasses later if need be.30 
In certifying each of these suits under Rule 23(b)(2), courts assumed that 
when the litigation arose out of a unifying trait that predated the litigation, 
such as race or gender, cohesion existed through similar interests.31  Most 
courts refused to engage in a debate over conflicting interests at all, 
preferring instead to gloss over differences with empty conclusions such as, 
“that the class may have included persons who support the [contested 
program] does not offend the principles set down in Hansberry v. Lee,”32 
and “[i]t is not ‘fatal if some members of the class might prefer not to have 
violations of their rights remedied.’”33  Other courts have been satisfied if 
the defendant represented the dissenters’ interest, a result that seems at odds 
with Hansberry.34 
These suits are puzzling from the perspective of overlapping interests and 
consent.  Class members’ overarching interests might align—in the school-
desegregation cases, all class members wanted what was best for their 
children—but they may fundamentally disagree over how to implement that 
common interest.  Moreover, Rule 23(b)(2) does not require the 
representatives to send class members notice of the pending suit, so 
dissenting class members may not know that they should appear and object.  
Nor could their failure to opt out be considered implicit consent; opting out 
is not an option in Rule 23(b)(2) classes. 
Results that fail to cohere to the interest-consent theory are not limited to 
Rule 23(b)(2); parens patriae suits yield similar decisions.  In parens 
patriae cases, the government—typically a state attorney general—sues to 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 58 
U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 892–93 (2010). 
 32. Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1357 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 33. Id. (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 873 (8th Cir. 1978)). 
 34. E.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 573 F.2d 676, 679–80 (10th Cir. 1978); Dierks v. Thompson, 414 
F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1969); Cmtys. for Equity, 192 F.R.D. at 574; Messier v. Southbury 
Training Sch., 183 F.R.D. 350, 358 (D. Conn. 1998); Wyatt v. Poundstone, 169 F.R.D. 155, 
161 (M.D. Ala. 1995); 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1768, at 397 (3d ed. 2005) (“As long as both those 
seeking to uphold and those desiring to strike the particular regulations are adequately 
represented, the suit may proceed as a class action.”).  In Hansberry v. Lee, the Supreme 
Court held that “[t]hose who sought to secure [the benefits of the agreement] by enforcing it 
could not be said to be in the same class with or represent those whose interest was in 
resisting performance.” 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940); cf. Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 
366 U.S. 683 (1961) (holding that nonparticipating association members could not intervene 
because they would not be bound by the lawsuit’s result). 
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protect the public interest.35  In this way, the parens patriae action assumes 
some of a class action’s characteristics, and the state attorney general 
mimics a class representative.  This analogy holds for precluding certain 
subsequent citizen suits, even though most parens patriae actions lack the 
class action’s certification procedures, including the adequacy 
requirement.36 
For example, when the Sierra Club sued under the Clean Air Act to 
enjoin Two Elk Generation Partners from building a coal-fired power plant, 
the Tenth Circuit barred the suit since a Wyoming district court had already 
affirmed the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council’s administrative 
order allowing it.37  Similarly, courts have precluded associations and 
residents from relitigating questions about implementing federal wildlife-
management statutes,38 building cell-phone towers,39 establishing a public-
recreation easement,40 enforcing fugitive-dust emission rules,41 and 
removing an abandoned dam.42 
In situations like these, the government’s interests need not overlap 
perfectly with the citizens’ interests; in fact, the result of a parens patriae 
suit can bind the citizen even if she objects to how the government handles 
the matter.43  Neither overlapping interests nor consent can explain this 
outcome.  The interest theory fails for obvious reasons:  despite conflicting 
interests, the result still binds the objector.  And the consent theory set forth 
in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts fails, too, since citizens typically cannot opt 
out of a parens patriae action.44 
 
 35. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1945) (permitting the state to 
attempt to enjoin discriminatory freight rates).  The Supreme Court has held that a state 
“must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State 
must be more than a nominal party” and must “express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).  This interest might include 
“the health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general” or it 
could be an “interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal 
system.” Id. 
 36. Some states have built adequacy requirements into their statutory authority for 
prosecuting actions under parens patriae. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2006) (barring 
subsequent citizen suits only “if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting” an enforcement action). 
 37. Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, Ltd., 646 F.3d 1258, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
 38. Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 39. Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 40. Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 
91 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 41. Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 473–74 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 42. Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 43. See Lucas, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 328–29 (precluding objectors from suing to enjoin a 
town from issuing telecommunications tower construction permits where the government 
had already entered into a consent judgment with the cellular telephone companies). 
 44. One might rely on a more abstract social contract theory, however. See generally 
IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING:  “THIS MAY BE TRUE IN THEORY, BUT IT DOES 
NOT APPLY IN PRACTICE” (1793), reprinted in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 73–74, 79 
(Hons Ress ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1970) (imagining that the 
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How are we to make sense of these inconsistent results?  Although 
threads of both consent and overlapping interests underpin modern-day 
cases, a doctrinal structure built around these traditional concepts fails to 
offer a cohesive, explanatory theory.  Worse, these concepts hold little 
promise of providing guiding principles for group litigation that lacks ex 
ante hurdles for adequate representation like those in Rule 23.  Thus, 
something more is needed. 
II.  INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION:  
AGGREGATE VERSUS INDIVIDUAL HARM 
In commenting on the consent-interest theory, Professor Robert Bone 
contended that pragmatism has always helped explain representative 
litigation.  Consent and its resulting agency relationship, as well as goal-
based interest representation, failed to capture what was best understood as 
representation’s “formal effect on legal rights and duties.”45  What better 
explained the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century judicial opinions 
was whether the litigation was personal or impersonal.  If “the remedy acted 
directly on rights or duties, such as those derived from contract,” then 
litigant autonomy was important, but “if the remedy acted on something 
impersonal, such as the legal incidents of an impersonal status or rights in 
an impersonal piece of property,” then the judgment could bind an absentee 
even without an opportunity to participate.46 
Historically, suits with impersonal qualities like those by a taxpayer 
challenging an unlawful municipal action and even private law cases that 
hinged on group rights and duties (such as one by a person who shared a 
single estate with others) were bound by res judicata.47  Still, as Professor 
Bone elaborated, “[a] binding representative suit did not necessarily have to 
involve status-based rights or duties arising as a matter of law, provided the 
remedy focused on impersonal rather than personal litigation elements.”48  
For a representative suit to bind a nonparty in impersonal cases, the remedy 
had to determine class members’ rights and duties—the common interest—
and each member’s interest in that remedy had to be identical.49  On the 
other hand, where the remedy affected a nonlitigant’s personal rights or 
 
social contract is not actual but imaginary, yet contending that it can obligate each citizen “as 
if he had consented”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 365 (Peter Laslet ed., 
2d ed. 1967) (1690) (contending that citizens have given tacit consent to a social contract 
with the government).  For examples of statutes that permit citizens to opt out, see infra note 
147. 
 45. Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms:  Reconceiving the 
History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 258–61 (1990) (reviewing 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
(1987)). 
 46. Id. at 263. 
 47. Id. at 274–77; see, e.g., McIntosh v. City of Pittsburgh, 112 F. 705, 707–08 (W.D. 
Pa. 1901) (binding all property owners affected by a municipal ordinance). 
 48. Bone, supra note 45, at 277. 
 49. Id. at 279–80. 
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duties as in contract or tort, courts afforded more autonomy and required 
something much closer to consent.50  In these cases, the litigants sent notice 
to the individuals, which essentially invited them to “opt into” the litigation.  
If affected individuals chose not to participate (and had justifiable reasons 
for not doing so), then the suit did not bind them.51 
Although I avoid using the terms personal or impersonal, this Article 
builds on these foundational concepts to construct an aggregate-rights 
framework for assessing the preclusive scope of aggregate litigation.  This 
framework is based on the observation that what really drives the result in 
modern cases is whether the initial injury constitutes an aggregate harm and 
whether remedying that harm must be accomplished uniformly.  When an 
aggregate harm demands a uniform, unindividuated remedy, it stands to 
reason that courts should preclude subsequent litigation even when the 
initial representation included group members with conflicting preferences.  
The key to legitimacy, however, lies in ensuring that absentees with diverse 
opinions have notice and the opportunity to be heard, particularly in 
shaping the relief. 
A.  When Is Inadequate Representation an Aggregate 
Versus Individual Harm? 
Aggregate harms and indivisible remedies map on to the right to 
adequate representation and help answer the question of whether and when 
adequate representation is a group or individual right.  If adequate 
representation is a group right and the group as a whole has been 
represented well, then preclusion should still attach to the judgment even if 
a single individual may be disappointed or aggrieved over the outcome.  
But if adequate representation is truly an individual right, then a would-be 
litigant could bring a second suit if the representative’s interest 
fundamentally conflicted with her own.52  Characterizing adequate 
representation as a group or individual right depends on the nature of the 
underlying injury and the group-based characteristics of the remedy in 
question.  The following sections build an aggregate-rights framework for 
differentiating between cases in which inadequate representation is a group 
or an individual harm.  Building on Professor Heather Gerken’s doctrinal 
structure for identifying aggregate harms, this framework relies on the 
following questions:  (1) is representation’s fairness and adequacy 
measured in group or individual terms, (2) does adequate representation rise 
and fall vis-à-vis group treatment, and (3) is inadequate representation 
unindividuated among group members?53 
 
 50. Id. at 282–83. 
 51. Id. at 282. 
 52. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (defining structural conflicts). 
 53. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 1663, 1682–89 (2001). 
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1.  Is Representation’s Fairness and Adequacy Measured in 
Group or Individual Terms? 
When the underlying right at stake is an aggregate one, evaluating 
fairness and adequacy in litigating that right must necessarily differ from 
the metric used in an individual right.54  Thinking of these underlying rights 
as falling along a continuum is helpful for two reasons.55  First, progressing 
along that continuum, toward an aggregate right, tells us when the group 
itself is important in understanding and prosecuting the underlying injury.56  
Second, a continuum identifies the litigation’s level of voluntariness.  
Aggregate harms demand aggregate remedies, thus decreasing the level of 
voluntariness in any given action. 
Commentators, including the American Law Institute (ALI) in its 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, claim that voluntariness is 
important in determining the required degree of overlapping interests.57  
The idea is that less voluntary actions should demand a higher degree of 
overlapping interests than those where an individual has more participation 
or control opportunities.58  But this framework demonstrates that 
voluntariness is indicative for a different reason:  people are drawn 
involuntarily into group litigation and saddled with a case’s outcome not 
necessarily because their interests are harmonious, but because the 
underlying right is an aggregate one and the subsequent remedy must inure 
to all or to none.  Thus, as this and subsequent sections explain, the right to 
adequate representation should track these distinctions. 
  
 
 54. Id. at 1682.  Professor Gerken describes a similar continuum, though its purpose 
differs from that described here.  Unlike Gerken’s definition of “group” in which she intends 
“‘a collection of individuals,’ not as an entity that exists separate and apart from its 
members,” I intend the far end of the aggregate rights spectrum to mean an entity.  In the 
past, I have used two examples to differentiate between these two poles: 
First, two individuals dance by a window to warn a third that the police are coming 
for her.  Both intend to warn and are each morally culpable for their collective 
action.  Contrast that example with a large corporation that has general will.  The 
corporation’s long-term interests are more than a sum its officers’, directors’, or 
even shareholders’ desires and beliefs.  In fact, those interests might even conflict.  
The corporation takes on a life of its own.  The dancing individuals are involved in 
a simple collective and are thus ontologically distinct from a corporate entity. The 
class action is more akin to a corporation than the dancers. 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21 (2009). 
 55. For an example of a similar, but distinct spectrum, see Hazard et al., supra note 1, at 
1852–58. 
 56. Gerken, supra note 53, at 1682. 
 57. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. 
(b)(1)(B) (2010). 
 58. Id. 
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Table 1 
 
 
 Individual 
Rights 
 
     Aggregate 
Rights 
Remedy Divisible 
Remedy 
     Indivisible 
Remedy 
 
Voluntariness Voluntary 
Individual 
Action 
 
     Involuntary 
Joinder  
Joinder Device None Rules 20, 
42 
MDL Rule 
23(b)(3) 
Rules 23(B)(1), 
23(B)(2) 
Parens 
patriae 
 
Examples Individual 
personal 
injury or 
other tort 
claims 
Bus 
accident 
involving 
20 people 
Mass 
Torts 
Securities 
Class 
Actions 
Desegregation 
Title VII 
Employment 
Discrimination, 
or Civil Rights 
Class Actions 
Public 
transit 
system 
fares 
State vs. State, 
Corporations59 
 
A purely individual right, such as a negligence claim arising from a run-
of-the-mill car accident, can be proven without referencing other car 
accidents across the state.60  That other drivers also have accidents is 
largely irrelevant.  Similarly, in a bus accident involving twenty people, any 
one of those individuals can prove her negligence claim against the bus 
company and its driver without including the other passengers.  Yet, the 
passenger might find it economically or pragmatically advantageous for her 
attorney to represent the other passengers too.  Presenting other passengers’ 
injuries could buttress jury sympathies and increase potential settlement 
value.  The judicial system might also determine that consolidating 
passengers’ suits under Rule 42 furthers judicial and litigant economy.61 
As we progress toward the middle of the continuum, values like judicial 
economy and convenience begin to crowd the traditional emphasis on 
individual participation and autonomy.  So, in a mass-tort case, for 
example, a single pharmaceutical company manufactures a drug that harms 
thousands of people by causing heart attacks and strokes and fails to warn 
them of these risks.  Just as in an individual-rights case, a consumer could 
prove her failure-to-warn claim without referencing other consumers.  But 
as 30,000 other users file suit, collectivization begins to take hold.62  The 
 
 59. Corporations are treated as a legal entity distinct from the individual members. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 59, at 93 (1982) (“Except as stated in this Section, 
a judgment in an action to which a corporation is a party has no preclusive effects on a 
person who is an officer, director, stockholder, or member of a non-stock corporation . . . .”). 
 60. See Gerken, supra note 53, at 1683. 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 42. 
 62. See Hazard et al., supra note 1, at 1853 (noting that “persons associated merely by 
the fact of their common victimization have some legal connections among themselves,” 
such as “being made the beneficiaries of issue preclusion” and being “limited to 
proportionate recovery where only a limited fund is available to satisfy their claims”). 
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attorneys working on a contingent fee consider it economically 
advantageous to represent as many consumers as possible.  The judicial 
system regards it far more efficient to coordinate these actions before the 
same judge through multidistrict litigation.  And the defendant, though it 
may seldom admit it, finds it useful to displace plaintiffs from their chosen 
fora, defend itself systematically in a single forum, and reach a settlement 
that encompasses as many consumers as possible.63  Still, no question exists 
as to who receives the remedy:  the consumer herself. 
Yet, as the number of litigants increase, an individual cannot participate 
as effectively; her case is intertwined with many others like it.64  A handful 
of bellwether trials may set a range of settlement values for thousands of 
cases.  And though individuals technically retain the right to accept or reject 
a settlement, consent is diminished through various settlement clauses that 
allow the defendant to withdraw the offer if too few claimants agree or that 
obligate participating attorneys to recommend the deal to one hundred 
percent of their clients.65 
Practicality’s importance increases the further the continuum progresses 
toward aggregate rights.  Just as litigants establishing general causation 
against the pharmaceutical company would rely on much of the same 
evidence in proving their claims, so too would plaintiffs bringing a Rule 
23(b)(3) securities-fraud class action.  Technically, however, securities-
fraud plaintiffs could still bring these suits individually and the remedy still 
goes directly to the injured party.  That is, the remedy is divisible among 
claimants.66  But the claim’s value might be too small to litigate 
individually, meaning that the investor has less interest in prosecuting her 
own case, and a class might be the only way to make the litigation’s 
economics worth pursuing.  Nevertheless, if she wanted to, an investor 
could opt out of the class and litigate on her own. 
Voluntariness wanes and practicality emerges as the guiding tenet as we 
come to mandatory class actions under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).67  
Consider again the 1970s school desegregation cases.  Those suits sought 
 
 63. See Burch, supra note 4; see also, e.g., Julie A. Steinberg, Pharmacy Supports MDL 
for Meningitis Suits but Disagrees with Plaintiffs’ Forum Choice, 13 Class Action Litig. 
Rep. (BNA) 1297 (Nov. 23, 2012). 
 64. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass 
Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 40–43 (2009). 
 65. See generally Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus 
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011). 
 66. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(a) (2010) 
(“Divisible remedies are those that entail the distribution of relief to one or more claimants 
individually, without determining in practical effect the application or availability of the 
same remedy to any other claimant.”). 
 67. The American Law Institute has treated these two class action categories in much the 
same way. Id. § 2.04 cmt. a, at 123 (“Courts, in short, have not succeeded in giving any 
distinct meaning to Rule 23(b)(1)(A) by comparison to Rule 23(b)(2).”).  Rule 23(b)(1)(B), 
known as the limited-fund class action, is likewise treated as a mandatory class for equitable 
reasons. 
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injunctive relief in the form of integration and busing—relief that would 
yield a uniform result regardless of whether a single individual or an entire 
group sued.68  In that sense, the relief was indivisible among the class 
members.69  Similarly, in a Title VII employment discrimination class 
action seeking to enjoin discriminatory behavior, the remedy is collective, 
at least as to the injunction and the declaratory judgment.70  Moreover, 
proving a discriminatory pattern or practice requires the judge to examine 
not only a given individual’s injury but also how the employer treated that 
person or that group of persons as compared with other workers.  Looking 
solely at how an individual is treated proves little in the way of a pattern or 
practice.  So, the underlying evidence needed to evaluate the claim arises 
from the group context. 
Now compare a client’s dissatisfaction with her attorney in three different 
scenarios and note how the group matters more or less when that 
dissatisfaction arises out of an individual car accident versus a failure-to-
warn claim in multidistrict litigation versus a Rule 23(b)(2) employment 
discrimination class action.  The way in which counsel represented other 
group members becomes increasingly relevant as the underlying right at 
stake increasingly concerns an aggregate harm. 
First, in the car-accident case, because individuals control the litigation 
and can hire and fire their attorneys, client dissatisfaction would typically 
take the form of a bar complaint or a malpractice action.  The client might 
allege that her attorney engaged in overreaching, exercised undue influence, 
or failed to discharge procedural or ministerial duties.71  The evidence she 
offers would refer solely to the attorney’s handling of her particular case; 
how that or other attorneys had litigated other car accidents would have 
little relevance.72 
Second, in the multidistrict failure-to-warn claim, an individual’s 
grievance against her attorney may reference other cases.  She might feel 
 
 68. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1419, 1433 (2003). 
 69. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(b) 
(“Indivisible remedies are those such that the distribution of relief to any claimant as a 
practical matter determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other 
claimants.”). 
 70. When Congress enacted Title VII, the remedial menu included a declaratory 
judgment that the defendant violated the Act and an injunction to prevent the defendant from 
continuing to discriminate.  The Supreme Court added the availability of back pay in 1975 
and Congress permitted compensatory and punitive damages in 1991. See Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072; Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
 71. See, e.g., Mavity v. Fraas, 456 F. Supp. 2d 29, 34 (D.D.C. 2006) (failing to file an 
exhibit before the trial deadline); In re Belmar, 319 B.R. 748, 755 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004) 
(failing to file pleadings); Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1067–68 (N.J. 
1996) (providing erroneous advice). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (2000). 
 72. To be sure, the standard of care in a legal malpractice case is the care that a similarly 
situation lawyer in a similarly situated case would provide. 
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that she received less than she deserved in a settlement after learning that 
other plaintiffs received more.  Or, she might be upset at the way her case 
was managed; attorneys might have tried other cases with stronger claims 
or less difficulty in establishing specific causation before hers.73  Either 
way, she compares her treatment vis-à-vis others’ treatment.  Alternatively, 
a client’s representational concern might focus on whom the judge appoints 
to a plaintiffs’ steering committee.  Because a steering committee 
spearheads the litigation and conducts settlement negotiations, it wrests 
control away from a plaintiff’s chosen attorney.  But a committee’s make-
up might not reflect a fair cross-spectrum of the plaintiffs’ diverse 
interests.74 
Finally, in a gender discrimination class action under Rule 23(b)(2) that 
seeks injunctive relief, if a class member collaterally attacked the settlement 
by claiming that the representative failed to adequately portray her interests, 
the court would necessarily examine how the attorney treated the class as a 
whole.75  After all, a class-action attorney must represent the interests of the 
entire class and prove “the existence of a class of persons who have 
suffered the same injury” that reveals a “policy of . . . discrimination” 
reflected in defendant’s employment practices.76  The disgruntled employee 
might have preferred not to litigate at all, to litigate by herself, or to request 
an entirely different remedy.77  But her individual choices have been 
restricted by practical necessity.  She is part of a collective that includes 
everyone else with similar claims against the company; she has no option to 
opt out.78  Some federal courts even require litigants to bring pattern-or-
practice cases as class actions.79  Thus, a subsequent court should find 
representation inadequate only if counsel’s conduct proved detrimental to 
the group as a whole.  Pragmatically, stifling these conflicts through 
subsequent group-based preclusion prevents conflicting remedies and 
ensures two-way preclusion, for both defendants and plaintiffs.80  In short, 
courts measure adequacy and fairness in group terms. 
 
 73. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together:  Social, Moral, and Legal 
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 98 (2011) (describing Betty Mekdeci’s situation in the 
Bendectin litigation where attorneys refused to relitigate her case so that they could bring 
stronger cases first). 
 74. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4). 
 76. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 (1982). 
 77. See Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 HARV. L. REV. 619, 
632 (1986). 
 78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), (3). 
 79. E.g., Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated 
on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 866–67 
n.6 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Celestine v. Petroleous de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355 
(5th Cir. 2001).  The rationale is that injunctive relief is indivisible, thus any litigation 
inherently affects the group and should be pursued as group litigation. See Allen v. Int’l 
Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 80. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 cmt. 
A (2010). 
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In sum, courts should evaluate grievances against attorneys differently 
depending on whether the underlying substantive right being prosecuted is 
aggregate or individual.  When an individual in a car accident chooses to 
sue and then feels that her attorney failed to protect her interests, courts 
evaluate inadequacy purely based on the attorney’s conduct in representing 
that person.81  How that attorney or another attorney has treated other car-
accident victims is largely irrelevant to this victim’s malpractice claim.  
Moreover, because she has the authority to hire and fire her attorney, that 
step is typically her simplest recourse given the difficulty of proving 
attorney malpractice.82  By contrast, the employee swept up in a Rule 
23(b)(2) gender-discrimination suit requesting injunctive relief may not 
have chosen to sue at all and might not even know that the suit was 
pending.  Her ability to participate in and control the suit is minimal at best.  
When she attempts to sue later for gender discrimination and the defendant 
raises preclusion as a defense, the court will likely consider an inadequate 
representation allegation in group terms.  So long as class counsel 
adequately represented the class members as a whole, she should be 
prevented from relitigating individually.  Fairness and adequacy are 
necessarily measured in group terms. 
2.  Does Adequate Representation Rise and Fall                                           
Vis-à-vis Group Treatment? 
When adequate representation qualifies as a group right—that is, in cases 
where the underlying cause of action is likewise aggregate—a group 
member cannot prove she was inadequately represented except by showing 
that counsel treated the whole group unfairly.  Just demonstrating that class 
members do not have identical interests does not establish inadequate 
representation so long as “substantially all of plaintiffs’ interests were 
vigorously presented . . . by the various parties.”83  Thus, courts are 
unlikely to allow a second action to proceed unless counsel in the first 
 
 81. Of course, the standard of care in a legal malpractice case is the care that a similarly 
situated lawyer in a similarly situated case would provide, but the individual here is not 
referencing a group of clients that are suing or being represented in concurrent lawsuits. 
 82. Malpractice claims based on errors in conducting litigation are sometimes difficult to 
prove because there is an exception for an honest exercise of professional judgment. Paul v. 
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, 599 S.E.2d 206, 208–09 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); see also Noske v. 
Friedberg, 713 N.W.2d 866, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).  Nevertheless, certainly there can be 
liability for failure to meet a deadline.  The difficulty with encouraging clients to fire their 
attorneys is that lay clients are often incapable of monitoring their attorney’s conduct.  So, 
while hiring and firing an attorney is the simplest recourse to this issue, it is not always a 
feasible option. 
 83. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 573 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Brown v. City 
of Barre, No. 5:10-cv-81, 2010 WL 5141783, at *7 (D. Vt. Dec. 13, 2010) (noting that even 
if class member lessees wanted to bring individual suits against their landlords for defaulting 
on their water bill rather than from the city, all members would benefit from an order barring 
the city from disconnecting the water service and “speculative disagreement about litigation 
strategy alone” did not render the class representation inadequate). 
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action was inept or failed to loyally represent the group.  A subsequent 
claim could also escape preclusion if a class representative secured a better 
deal for herself than for the rest of the class84 or purported to represent a 
poorly defined class that was either not cohesive or included both alleged 
victims and aggressors.85  In short, a defendant invoking preclusion as a 
defense in a second case can overcome a claim of inadequate representation 
by showing that the representatives in the first case treated the rest of the 
group fairly.86  Or, if the court agrees with the plaintiff and finds that 
counsel inadequately represented the whole group in pursuing an aggregate 
harm, then any group member—regardless of whether she was satisfied 
with the initial representation—should be able to sue again. 
Precluding subsequent actions where the underlying harm is aggregate 
makes some sense historically.  In tracing the modern-day class action back 
to its medieval roots where people lived within rural villages and religious 
parishes comprised the “community of the vill,”87 Professor Yeazell found 
that each community member shared in the duties, privileges, and 
obligations of villeinage membership.88  Community members were jointly 
liable for any duty that might principally be assigned to just one of them.89  
Accordingly, manor courts routinely imposed collective liability on villages 
for shared obligations, often regardless of who was individually responsible 
for an act like trampling crops.90  Although they came to collectivity in a 
different way, those living in medieval towns voluntarily formed highly 
cohesive merchant guilds, craft guilds, and boroughs through social 
 
 84. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 852 (9th Cir. 2000); Brown v. 
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 
248 F.R.D. 389, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Foster v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 599, 604 (D. 
Minn. 2005); cf. Martin v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 198, 203–04 (W.D. Tex. 
2004) (finding class representatives inadequate because they failed to bring all potential 
causes of action available to putative class members). 
 85. See, e.g., Moore v. Napolitano, 269 F.R.D. 21, 34 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying 
certification because the putative class included both people who alleged discrimination and 
their supervisors, the alleged discriminators); King v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 231 F.R.D. 
255, 264–65 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (denying certification, in part, because supervisory class 
members could be called to refute other class members’ allegations); Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 
222 F.R.D. 260, 269 (D. Md. 2004) (denying certification, in part, because some class 
members were managers in the human resources division and handled other members’ 
discrimination complaints); see also infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (discussing 
Falcon). 
 86. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 677 F.2d 471, 489–90 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(finding that antagonistic interests among the class members did not render representation 
inadequate); Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 386 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that class 
members would be adequately represented even if they disagreed as to what relief to request 
because they all had an interest in having prison conditions declared unlawful and members 
would have the opportunity to comment on the relief). 
 87. See YEAZELL, supra note 45, at 41–48. 
 88. Id. at 42–52; see also Bone, supra note 45, at 219–20. 
 89. YEAZELL, supra note 45, at 48 (quoting PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE 
MANOR 318–19 (rev. 2d ed. 1932)). 
 90. Id. at 50–51. 
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bonds.91  As phrased by Robert Bone, “Obligation and privilege attached to 
the group qua group, with the group allocating the burdens and benefits 
among its members.  Moreover, each group member was individually liable 
for the entire group obligation and had to resort to internal group 
mechanisms to spread the burden.”92 
Of course, the types of harms that we consider aggregate harms today are 
quite different from those in medieval times.  If someone in a modern-day 
neighborhood tramples someone else’s garden in another community, the 
whole neighborhood is not responsible.  Yet, the fundamental principle of 
an aggregate harm remains the same:  a collective quality exists in the relief 
sought.  Thus, in both old and new situations involving aggregate rights, a 
group member cannot subsequently claim that she was inadequately 
represented in pursuing that right unless she proves that counsel treated the 
whole group unfairly. 
3.  Is Inadequate Representation Unindividuated Among Group Members? 
Finally, inadequate representation claims differ when the underlying 
harm is aggregate because a court cannot distinguish those who are harmed 
by the litigation’s mishandling from those who are not.  That is, the injury 
caused by inadequate representation is unindividuated among those 
represented.  Aggregate harms, like housing-desegregation or school-busing 
cases, typically necessitate an indivisible remedy such as an injunction or 
declaratory judgment.  Each group member has an equal stake in pursuing 
an indivisible remedy and each benefits from (or is harmed by) the relief 
equally.  While each member has standing to bring a claim, no member has 
the right to an individual outcome independent of the other group 
members.93  It likewise makes sense that when counsel or a class 
representative spoils that effort, the group experiences inadequate 
representation equally.94  And when the lawyer’s efforts lead to a positive 
change in policies or practices, then that change—in theory at least—helps 
all of the group members, regardless of whether they wanted to sue in the 
first place.  By this thinking, in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, the class 
representative matters very little; the group members should be 
interchangeable. 
Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in General Telephone 
Co. v. Falcon.95  Mariano Falcon, an employee claiming his employer 
 
 91. Id. at 42–44, 58–60. 
 92. Bone, supra note 45, at 220. 
 93. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1059. 
 94. See id. at 1058 (“[I]n cases for injunctive relief against institutional conduct, it is 
difficult to conceptualize an individual right of autonomy, even where we would no doubt 
recognize an individual’s ability to bring a claim in court.  In such circumstances, an 
individual may be an exemplar of the harm visited by allegedly wrongful institutional 
conduct, but that same individual cannot claim an autonomous right to separate control of 
the outcome of the legal challenge.”). 
 95. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
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discriminated against him in denying his promotion, could not also 
represent other Mexican Americans who had not been hired.96  The 
underlying claim could be considered either an aggregate or an individual 
harm, depending on the allegations.  Mr. Falcon could have sued for 
discrimination individually and his claim would have focused specifically 
on his failed promotion.  There would be no need to reference how General 
Telephone treated other Mexican Americans to prove that it discriminated 
against him.  Or he could have (as he did) brought a disparate-treatment 
claim on behalf of all Mexican Americans working at General Telephone 
Company who were denied promotions.  In that case, the evidence would 
focus on how General Telephone promoted whites compared with Mexican 
Americans.  The baseline for measuring fairness depended on this 
comparison. 
The problem, of course, was that Mr. Falcon tried to represent both 
Mexican Americans who had been denied promotions and those who had 
not been hired:  two groups that were not sufficiently cohesive.  Rule 23 
presumes the representative is self-interested and that, because his interests 
are typical of the group’s interests, he will benefit the group by selfishly 
pursuing his own agenda.97  The concern then was that Mr. Falcon, as a 
current employee, had no self-interested reason to care about hiring.  
Moreover, the two claims required different facts; evidence as to how 
General Telephone discriminated in promoting employees would not 
illuminate facts about how it discriminated in hiring.  Thus, “Mexican 
Americans,” as a defined group, were not interchangeable.  Remedying 
discriminatory promotion practices would not necessarily remedy 
discriminatory hiring practices.  Based on this logic, had the overarching 
class been certified, a Mexican American who was not hired for 
discriminatory reasons could bring a subsequent suit and allege inadequate 
representation in the first action.  That harm is an aggregate harm that all 
Mexican Americans who would have been hired, but for the discrimination, 
share. 
By contrast, poor representation in pursuing individual harms can be 
individuated among group members.  Group members are not fungible or 
interchangeable for liability or remedial purposes.98  If a drug company 
fails to warn patients of the risks of a heart attack or stroke associated with 
its pain reliever, patients experience that harm differently.  Some will have 
no adverse effects, others will experience a heart attack or stroke and 
recover, and others will not recover.  Though each patient shares common 
facts with one another based on the labeling, they have different genetic 
 
 96. Id. at 158–59. 
 97. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05, cmt. h 
(2010) (“By acting in ways that help themselves, these parties should help others 
automatically.”). 
 98. See Gerken, supra note 53, at 1687 (contrasting the unindividuated harm in vote 
dilution cases from the individuated harm in a classic rights suit). 
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predispositions, may receive unique information from their doctors, and 
will ultimately have to prove specific causation as well as general causation.  
Consequently, all group members are not injured equally from the 
mislabeling and it would not necessarily be inconsistent to award damages 
to one patient and not another. 
When counsel represents numerous tort victims seeking divisible 
remedies in situations like the failure-to-warn scenario, it is possible for a 
settlement to benefit some at the expense of others and for some to have a 
valid grievance against their attorney whereas others do not.  This was one 
of the problems in Amchem:  attorneys cut a better deal for their “inventory” 
plaintiffs (their current clients) than for those who had not yet sued.99  The 
inventory plaintiffs were thus better off than their future counterparts and 
the court could have readily sorted those whom the inadequate 
representation injured from those whom it did not. 
 
* * * * * 
Thus far, we have differentiated between how courts should handle 
preclusion in subsequent lawsuits depending on whether the underlying 
injury in the first action was an aggregate harm.  When the underlying claim 
flows from an aggregate harm, it follows that inadequately representing one 
group member in prosecuting that harm is the same as inadequately 
representing the whole group.  The harm is aggregate and the remedy—
typically declaratory or injunctive relief—is likewise indivisible.  If one 
group member receives the remedy, then they all receive the remedy.  If one 
group member is inadequately represented, then they are all inadequately 
represented.  It makes sense practically (if not theoretically) that courts 
tolerate greater conflicts among group members when evaluating a 
subsequent inadequate representation claim.  Successful claims of this sort 
tend to be those where the lawyers and, potentially, the named 
representatives acted contrary to the group’s best interests or, as in Falcon, 
tried to represent an overinclusive group where some members would 
require a remedy that the representative had no selfish reason to pursue. 
Conversely, when litigants each suffer individual harm at the hands of 
the same defendant and decide to pool their claims together for economic or 
other functional reasons, that collectivization does not change the nature of 
the underlying individual harm.  When counsel poorly represents an 
individual in litigating that harm, inadequate representation is an individual 
injury.  Another way to think about this distinction is from a remedial 
standpoint.  When a remedy adheres to the notion “if as to one, then as to 
all,” as is the case in indivisible remedies, then an inadequate representation 
claim likewise rises and falls with the group.  But divisible remedies tend to 
be different.  Inadequately representing one group member in demanding 
damages, for example, does not automatically mean that the rest of the 
 
 99. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600–01, 606, 626–27 (1997). 
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group was harmed.  In fact, some members might benefit from others’ 
inadequate representation, as was the case in Amchem.  Here, courts should 
look for “structural conflicts” between the claimants themselves, and the 
representatives and the claimants.100 
There are, however, some stumbling blocks to a dichotomy based on 
distinguishing between whether the underlying right at stake is aggregate or 
individual and then characterizing a subsequent inadequate representation 
claim along similar lines.  First, it does not address how courts should 
handle inadequate representation in circumstances where group members 
experience an aggregate harm but request both divisible and indivisible 
remedies.  Second, it does not consider the unfairness of a situation in 
which group members suffer an aggregate harm but receive no notice of the 
pending suit and may have vastly conflicting opinions about which 
remedies to request.  The next two sections consider each problem in turn. 
B.  Inadequate Representation in Hybrid Claims:  
Aggregate Harms, Divisible Remedies 
How should a court handle subsequent inadequate representation claims 
in cases where the underlying harm was aggregate but the requested relief 
included both indivisible and divisible remedies?  For example, when 
employees file gender discrimination claims under Title VII, they typically 
request declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future discrimination.  
Yet, Title VII also allows them to demand compensatory and punitive 
damages, damages that are divisible among the class members but flow 
from the aggregate harm.101  Similarly, if an industrial plant taints a 
community’s groundwater, the harms—the release of the chemical and the 
potential for future emissions—prompt aggregate remedies of declaratory 
and injunctive relief.  Plaintiffs want an indivisible remedy to enjoin 
subsequent emissions and a declaration as to the clean up.  But some people 
may experience more harm than others; they might live closer to the plant 
and face greater personal injuries or property damage as a result. 
In both of these examples, the underlying harm is aggregate, but 
recovering monetary damages for the way in which that harm has affected 
each individual demands proof of specific causation.  If a court evaluated 
counsel’s representation solely in pursuing the aggregate harm—gender 
discrimination or groundwater contamination—it would allow for greater 
 
 100. See generally AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
§ 2.07(a).  A structural conflict is a conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the 
lawyers who would represent claimants on an aggregate basis” or  
among the claimants themselves that would present a significant risk that the 
lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as 
to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of 
their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers 
themselves. 
Id. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1), (b) (2006). 
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conflicts within the represented group.  A judge would measure fairness in 
group terms, considering whether counsel treated the rest of the group 
members fairly and, if not, all group members would have been 
inadequately represented.  By contrast, if a judge looked solely at counsel’s 
work in pursuing divisible remedies and found that class members’ interests 
were antagonistic to one another (counsel represented plaintiffs with present 
injuries as well as those who had merely been exposed to the contaminated 
groundwater and might develop future injuries), then she would be more 
likely to permit a collateral attack. 
These scenarios—a Title VII pattern-or-practice case demanding 
compensatory and punitive damages and a toxic-tort case requesting 
divisible and indivisible relief—raise several issues for a plaintiff 
subsequently claiming inadequate representation and for courts using this 
aggregate-rights framework to decide her claim.  First is the problem of 
characterization.  As the punitive damages claim illustrates, it is not always 
easy to pinpoint whether the underlying claim in question is aggregate.  One 
solution is to subject each questionable claim to the same rubric used here 
for distinguishing between aggregate and individual rights.  As Professor 
Gerken used to explain the voting-dilution cases and I have refashioned to 
distinguish between inadequate representation claims, there are at least 
three differences between aggregate and individual rights.  First, when a 
right is aggregate, “fairness is measured in group terms,” even if the harm 
itself injures an individual.102  Second, an aggregate right “rises and falls 
with the treatment of the group.”103  Third, an aggregate right “is 
unindividuated among members of the group; no [group member] is more 
or less injured than any other [group member].”104 
Applying this framework requires understanding both the law 
surrounding the remedy at stake—let’s consider punitive damages—and the 
law governing the underlying right—Title VII, for example.  By some 
reasoning, punitive damages seem to remedy an aggregate harm at least 
when plaintiffs request them based on the defendant’s conduct toward the 
whole class.105  Punishing a defendant’s pattern of discriminatory behavior 
toward women, for instance, hinges on whether plaintiffs can establish the 
underlying wrong to the group as a whole by proving the same 
 
 102. Gerken, supra note 53, at 1681–84. 
 103. Id. at 1684–86. 
 104. Id. at 1738. 
 105. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 622 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 3:08CV540-RJC-DSC, 2010 
WL 143725, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2010); Olvera-Morales v. Int’l Labor Mgmt. Corp., 
246 F.R.D. 250, 258–59 (M.D.N.C. 2007) (noting that, because plaintiffs requested punitive 
damages based on “the Defendants’ conduct to the putative class as a whole,” there was no 
need to contemplate “the intangible, subjective differences of each class member’s 
circumstances”); Brown v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 08 C 5908, 2011 WL 1838741, at *6–7 
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2011) (certifying a hybrid class, but providing only a cursory explanation 
of why compensatory and punitive damages do not undermine the predominance of common 
questions); Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.R.D. 430, 439–40 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
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discriminatory act or series of acts.106  That necessitates evidence of 
discriminatory, company-wide practices and policies where the punitive 
damages claim rises and falls with the way the defendant treated the group. 
Yet, even though punitive damages seem instinctively like an aggregate 
remedy because they address the defendant’s conduct toward a protected 
group, recent Supreme Court cases on punitive damages and Title VII 
suggest that punitive damages may be individual, divisible remedies.107  
Title VII allows for up to $300,000 in punitive damages for each employee 
but requires plaintiffs to show that the employer engaged in a pattern or 
practice of discrimination “with malice or with reckless indifference to the 
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”108  Thus, some have 
argued that Title VII should be interpreted to preclude punitive damages on 
a class-wide basis unless plaintiffs show individualized injuries.109  When 
courts conduct a fact-specific inquiry into whether each class member 
would be entitled to those damages, it is entirely possible that some 
members would receive them and others would not.110  Punitive damages 
would thus be divisible among the claimants and would not rise and fall 
with the defendant’s treatment of the group.  If courts cannot award 
punitive damages under Title VII without determining whether each 
employee is eligible and those awards punish the defendant’s wrongdoing 
only as to a particular plaintiff,111 this implies that punitive damages 
remedy an individual harm and count as divisible remedies. 
The Supreme Court’s punitive damages decisions lend further support to 
this view.  State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell,112 Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams,113 and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker114 can each be 
read to suggest that punitive damages remedy individual injuries.115  The 
upshot of Williams is that punitive damage awards can punish the 
defendant’s wrongdoing only as to a particular plaintiff, not as to those 
similarly situated.116  Exxon Shipping and State Farm both indicate that 
punitive damage awards must be tethered to compensatory damages (or, at 
 
 106. See, e.g., Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 438 (focusing on the defendant’s conduct as 
opposed to the class members’ individualized harms); cf. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 
151 F.3d 402, 417 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to decide whether punitive damages are 
available on a class-wide basis). 
 107. See, e.g., Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 358, 379–80 (E.D. Ark. 
2007). 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), (b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 109. E.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 417 (noting that the plain language of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 could be interpreted this way, but declining to reach the question). 
 110. Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 379. 
 111. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011); Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2007). 
 112. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 113. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 114. 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 115. Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 376. 
 116. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353–54. 
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the very least, backpay).117  Given that courts can no longer award backpay 
under Title VII without determining whether each employee is eligible,118 
the fairness of awarding punitive damages would be measured in individual 
terms.  Likewise, it is possible to award punitive damages to some group 
members and not others.  Consequently, punitive damage claims could be 
considered individual claims. 
Trying to situate punitive damage claims within the aggregate-rights 
framework brings up a second problem:  How should courts characterize 
subsequent inadequate representation claims where the initial litigation 
concerned an indisputably aggregate right, but requested both divisible and 
indivisible remedies? 
There are at least two potential solutions to this complication.  First, 
courts faced with inadequate representation allegations might closely 
examine the specific facts to pinpoint whether the deficiency turns on the 
handling of divisible or indivisible remedies.  If the claim arose out of how 
counsel represented the group in litigating indivisible remedies, then 
intragroup conflicts would be more tolerable.  The plaintiff would need to 
explain either how the representation hurt the group as a whole or how, as 
in Falcon, the initial group was poorly defined and not cohesive.119  
Alternatively, if divisible remedies were involved, then plaintiffs must have 
had an opportunity to exit the litigation120 and, as Amchem requires, the 
litigation must have been free both from intragroup conflicts and structural 
conflicts between the representative and the group.121 
Yet, in practice this ex post solution is problematic.  The dividing line 
between types of relief may be clear enough, but when counsel represents 
plaintiffs in pursuing an aggregate right and requests both divisible and 
indivisible remedies, the representation itself cannot be segregated so 
easily.  Tradeoffs are inevitable.  The defendant might be willing to institute 
new practices that prevent future aggregate harms like sexual harassment 
policies, less subjective promotion criteria, or pollution contamination 
measures in exchange for reduced compensatory or punitive damages.  
 
 117. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 514 (2008); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 
423 (2003); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives:  The Punitive Damage Class, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 845, 882 (2010). 
 118. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
 119. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158–59 (1982). 
 120. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (“While we have never held [that the absence of notice 
and opt-out rights violate due process] where the monetary claims do not predominate, the 
serious possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) 
to include the monetary claims here.”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 
(1985) (holding that, where claims are predominately for monetary damages, the Due 
Process Clause requires the right to notice and opt out); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 
F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the lack of an opportunity for the plaintiff to opt 
out prevented the use of res judicata). 
 121. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600–01, 606, 626–27 (1997); see 
also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (2010). 
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Thus, identifying where counsel’s work fell short and second-guessing 
those trade-offs may be impractical. 
The second possibility for addressing aggregate harms that entail both 
divisible and indivisible remedies is to limit the representation’s scope ex 
ante, such that it includes only aggregate rights seeking indivisible 
remedies.122  This should likewise limit the action’s preclusive effect to 
aggregate harms, which means that a plaintiff seeking to relitigate those 
questions would have to demonstrate that the inadequate representation 
harmed the group as a whole.  Intragroup conflicts would matter less.  Yet, 
if plaintiffs won the first suit, then subsequent individual suits seeking 
divisible remedies could use issue preclusion offensively to avoid 
relitigating questions over aggregate harms. 
Granted, there are drawbacks to this ex ante approach.  These drawbacks 
center mainly on whether the first court can limit the scope of preclusion in 
subsequent cases.123  After all, the core of claim preclusion—that plaintiffs 
should bring all related claims in one action—is antithetical to the idea of 
addressing only aggregate harms and indivisible relief collectively and then 
allowing follow-on actions for divisible relief.  This approach also runs up 
against the maxim that a court “cannot conclusively determine the res 
judicata effect of [its own] decision.”124  In Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, 
courts have occasionally held that the class representative’s failure to 
request compensatory damages alongside declaratory or injunctive relief 
signals inadequate representation.125  Other courts have, however, decided 
that splitting claims between individual and aggregate harms to facilitate 
class certification of the latter is perfectly permissible.126 
In his article titled, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, Professor 
Tobias Wolff has persuasively argued the error of the preclusion maxim 
 
 122. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(c) 
(suggesting courts “authorize aggregate treatment of common issues concerning an 
indivisible remedy . . . even though additional divisible remedies are also available that 
warrant individual treatment or aggregate treatment with the opportunity of claimants to 
exclude themselves”); Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1073. 
 123. This is a matter of much confusion in lower court cases based primarily on the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 
(1984).  For a helpful overview of this case as well as the entire problem, see Wolff, supra 
note 1, at 724–31. 
 124. Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex. 
1999); see also Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64, 80 (M.D. Tenn. 
2004) (“Although thus declaring that the judgment in a class action includes the class, as 
defined, subdivision (c)(3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the court 
conducting the action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; this can 
be tested only in a subsequent action.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(3) advisory 
committee’s note)). 
 125. E.g., Colindres v. QuietFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347, 375 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Zachery, 
185 F.R.D. at 243. 
 126. See, e.g., Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1993); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. 
Servs. of Bos., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 265 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see also Edward F. Sherman, 
“Abandoned Claims” in Class Actions:  Implications for Preclusion and Adequacy of 
Counsel, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (2011). 
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against a court determining the effect of its own decision.127  As he notes, 
“[t]he most basic reform that is needed in this arena is for rendering fora to 
recognize and claim their proper role as expositors of positive law in 
assessing and controlling the preclusive effects of their own judgments.”128  
Moreover, there is no theoretical basis or logical reason for this controlling 
maxim.129 
Although Professor Wolff suggests several tools for courts to employ, the 
most important is Rule 41, which gives federal courts the ability to dismiss 
claims without prejudice.130  As the Supreme Court recognized in Semtek 
International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., this designation prevents 
subsequent courts from affording any preclusive force to the dismissed 
claims.131  Stated in terms of claim preclusion, dismissing a claim without 
prejudice is not a dismissal on the merits and is thus not afforded a 
preclusive effect.132  Likewise, in class actions, courts can use their Rule 
23(e) authority to approve settlements that place careful constraints on 
which claims are settled and which could be litigated in the future.133  Still, 
until courts uniformly recognize the value of collectively litigating only 
aggregate harms demanding indivisible remedies and leaving divisible 
remedies to subsequent actions, some danger exists that the initial 
aggregation will impede and preclude rather than facilitate successive 
individual cases.134 
C.  Improving Adequacy in Aggregate Harms That Seek Indivisible 
Remedies:  “Notice and Comment” 
Even if a rendering court can limit its judgment’s preclusive scope, this 
framework paints a bleak picture for group members experiencing an 
aggregate harm demanding an indivisible remedy.  On the front end, group 
members are not entitled to notice or an opportunity to be heard in Rule 
23(b)(1) or (b)(2) actions, and most parens patriae statutes produce similar 
results.  This means that those affected by the judgment have no chance to 
influence the litigation, shape the remedy, or participate in decision 
 
 127. Wolff, supra note 1, at 752–89. 
 128. Id. at 752. 
 129. Id. at 758–65, 767. 
 130. Id. at 758–64. 
 131. 531 U.S. 497, 506–09 (2001); Wolff, supra note 1, at 760–61. 
 132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(b) (1982) (“[T]he general rule 
[against splitting claims] does not apply [when] . . . [t]he court in the first action has 
expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action.”); see Wolff, supra 
note 1, at 762. 
 133. Wolff, supra note 1, at 766 (citing Trotsky v. L.A. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 Cal. 
Rptr. 637, 646 (Ct. App. 1975)). 
 134. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1073 (“But absent a clear doctrine on the res judicata 
effect of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, diligent plaintiffs’ counsel would have felt compelled 
to assert all possible remedies for the class members for fear of waiving valuable individual 
claims of some of the class members.”). 
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making—all of which can impair the perception of procedural justice.135  
On the back end, courts find intragroup conflicts over these matters trifling 
and conclude that they are not sufficient reasons to unravel the litigation 
through collateral attack.136 
Granted, what these decisions lack in theoretical coherence, they make up 
in pragmatic balancing.  In many parens patriae and Rule 23(b)(2) cases, 
the absent parties’ rights would be affected regardless of whether they were 
a formal party to the suit because of the injunctive relief requested.  If a city 
decides to lift a curfew based on one person’s lawsuit, that decision affects 
all residents equally—whether they were an actual party or not.  The same 
is true for school-busing cases, decisions to integrate nursing homes, and 
remedies aimed at thwarting race and gender discrimination.  Thus, these 
res judicata results make sense in terms of real-world consequences and the 
need to prevent conflicting decisions, though not in terms of consent and 
identity of interests.  Nevertheless, the theoretical shift towards pragmatism 
seems to have written the Due Process Clause’s notion of adequacy out of 
the equation. 
How then can courts improve representational adequacy in pursuing 
aggregate harms?  The answer cannot come through preclusion because 
tying group members to the result in these cases has clear practical benefits.  
Otherwise, defendants might be faced with conflicting court opinions with 
which they cannot possibly comply.  So, the answer must lie at the front 
end of litigation. 
Where there can be only one uniform remedy that affects the entire 
group, the answer must be to permit as many “inputs” as possible in 
considering and fashioning that remedy.137  When the underlying harm is 
aggregate, those affected by that harm should be notified of the pending 
litigation and, after the court adjudicates liability, they should have the 
chance to comment on and potentially influence the court’s remedy.138  As 
the Supreme Court has recognized, adequate representation is not a 
substitute for proper notice;139 notice, an opportunity to be heard, and 
adequate representation are all cornerstones of due process.140 
Notice and the opportunity to be heard have value even if the controlling 
parties do not ultimately incorporate group members’ divergent views into 
 
 135. See Burch, supra note 64, at 7–11, 37–43. 
 136. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 137. See, e.g., Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 386 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“More important, 
this Court can afford class members the opportunity to comment on the issue of relief if their 
views on this subject are truly discordant.”). 
 138. See id.; see also Imasuen v. Moyer, No. 91 C 5425, 1992 WL 26705, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 7, 1992) (“Any differences of opinion within the class concerning the effect of proposed 
remedies can be dealt with in the remedies aspect of the litigation, after the constitutionality 
of the INS detention system has been adjudicated.”). 
 139. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974). 
 140. Granted, Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not require notice before foreclosing class 
members’ rights and the Supreme Court approves those rules. 
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the litigation’s resolution.141  Empirical studies on procedural justice 
demonstrate that the simple opportunity to state one’s position to a decision 
maker is independently valuable because those bound by the decision 
regard the outcome as more legitimate.142  Requiring participation 
opportunities where aggregate rights are at stake may also improve the 
outcome.  As Howard Reingold’s Smart Mobs, Jim Surowiecki’s Wisdom of 
Crowds, and Scott Page’s The Difference have demonstrated through social 
science, groups of diverse people can make accurate predictions, solve 
problems, improve performance, and aggregate information.143  Thus, 
providing notice and an opportunity to be heard in a mandatory class or 
parens patriae action can lead to forceful advocacy that fosters well-
developed arguments, increased legitimacy, and dissenters who are 
ultimately more willing to accept the outcome.144  In this sense, conflict and 
dissonance are beneficial; they encourage novel solutions, diverse ideas, 
and creative problem solving.145  As game theorists demonstrate, increased 
participation and bargaining—more “trades”—promotes more solutions.146  
Accordingly, the more initial disagreement about what is important and 
how to fashion an appropriate remedy, the better. 
The feasibility of allowing notice and comment opportunities vary based 
on the procedural mechanism used to aggregate claims.  Currently, notice is 
permitted but not required in mandatory classes that proceed under Rule 
23(b)(1) or (b)(2).  Likewise, some but not all parens patriae statutes 
require notice.147  California’s antitrust statute uses commendable, 
exemplary language: 
In any action brought under this section, the Attorney General shall, at 
any time, in any manner, and with any content as the court may direct, 
 
 141. See Burch, supra note 64, at 37–38. 
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 143. See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE:  HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY 
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409, 413 (2009). 
 146. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982). 
 147. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (2006) (federal antitrust statute requiring courts to 
give notice of parens patriae actions by publication); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(e) (2012) 
(Alaska’s version of the parens patriae antitrust statute, which requires notice and opt-out 
rights); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-212 (2011) (requiring notice for Arkansas’s Unfair Practices 
Act); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16760(b)(1) (West 2008).  Some statutes have also created 
opt-out rights for parens patriae actions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(e); CAL. BUS. 
& PROF. CODE § 16760(b)(2). 
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cause notice thereof to be given by publication.  If the court finds that 
notice given solely by publication would deny due process of law to any 
person or persons, the court may direct further notice to the person or 
persons according to the circumstances of the case.148 
This kind of language gives courts the flexibility to ensure that notice is not 
cost prohibitive, but authorizes them to require additional notice if 
individual property interests are at stake.  In sum, providing notice to 
affected parties (whether through Rule 23’s built in procedures for (b)(1) or 
(b)(2) claims, or by statute for parens patriae suits) increases the legitimacy 
of the outcome in mandatory actions. 
III.  APPLYING THE AGGREGATE-RIGHTS FRAMEWORK TO 
ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE PROCEDURES   
As we have seen, although threads of both consent and overlapping 
interests underpin many modern-day cases, those theories fail to explain 
how courts can legitimately bind dissenters in mandatory litigation, such as 
a traditional Rule 23(b)(2) class.  When class members collaterally attack 
the class settlement and claim that they were inadequately represented, 
courts frequently dismiss those allegations without offering a coherent 
rationale.  The aggregate-rights framework set forth in Part II, which 
suggests that courts should differentiate between inadequate representation 
claims based on the underlying right at stake, provides an alterative means 
for courts to evaluate and understand those claims.  That framework’s use, 
however, is not limited solely to Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) cases.  It can also 
help alleviate similar dilemmas in class-action alternatives, such as parens 
patriae suits and multidistrict litigation.  Accordingly, this part explains this 
framework’s utility in these alternative contexts. 
A.  Parens Patriae 
As class actions have become increasingly difficult to certify149 and 
courts enforce arbitration clauses that prohibit aggregating claims,150 
scholars have urged states’ attorneys general to step in and sue on behalf of 
their citizens using their parens patriae authority.151  This not only avoids 
arbitration and rigorous class certification standards, but may also prevent 
private attorneys from siphoning off a hefty chunk of citizens’ damages for 
their attorneys’ fees.152  Yet, parens patriae actions, which are not subject 
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to Rule 23’s class certification criteria, are a double-edged sword.  Not 
subjecting these actions to stringent certification standards means that they 
are easier to bring and may thus be more successful in deterring 
wrongdoing.  But it also means that there is no judicial check on adequate 
representation as there would be in a class action.153  This, in turn, means 
that the preclusive scope of the judgment is uncertain at best, particularly 
when an attorney general sues for both indivisible and divisible remedies. 
Nevertheless, the aggregate-rights framework can enhance clarity when 
judging the preclusive force of parens patriae actions.  Traditional parens 
patriae cases involve aggregate rights where the state sues to vindicate its 
citizens’ public interest.  So, for example, when a state sues another state 
for the right to divert and use water, the resulting judgment binds both the 
state and its citizens.154  The same result should be true when a state sues to 
establish public transit system fares,155 implement a federal wildlife-
management statute,156 or determine whether a cellular company can build 
its towers.157  In Lucas v. Planning Board, where citizens sued after the 
municipality entered into an agreement to permit a cellular company to 
construct its towers, the court explained that the town adequately 
represented its residents because “[t]he interests asserted [in the prior 
litigation] were of an exclusively public character.”158 
In many ways, however, these are straightforward cases under the 
aggregate-rights framework—they involve aggregate rights and request 
indivisible relief.  As the court in Lucas put it, the citizens had “no private 
interests or individual rights that extend[ed] beyond the general public 
interest asserted by the Town.”159  Thus, there was no reason to doubt the 
preclusive force of the first case “since ‘governments are by their nature 
representative of the cumulative rights of private citizens.’”160  The public’s 
interest is diffuse and the rights asserted were clearly aggregate rights.  
Accordingly, any sort of harm from inadequate representation would be 
unindividuated among group members, which means that the court properly 
evaluated the representation in group terms.  Because the relief requested is 
indivisible, pragmatism suggests that multiple actions could lead to 
conflicting obligations. 
 
actions, so the cost savings for plaintiffs may not be as great as anticipated. See, e.g., Gilles 
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 153. See Lemos, supra note 2, at 535–42. 
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 156. Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 157. Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 328–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 158. Id. at 328. 
 159. Id. at 329. 
 160. Id. (quoting 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
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The preclusive scope of parens patriae actions asserting individual rights 
and seeking damages on behalf of those individuals should be equally clear.  
Preclusion should not attach to a judgment where:  a structural conflict161 
exists between the attorney general’s and the citizen’s interests, the attorney 
general failed to prosecute the lawsuit, or the attorney general lacked a 
motive to pursue the case vigorously.162  In its 1961 ruling in Sam Fox 
Publishing Co. v. United States,163 the Supreme Court explained that “[w]e 
regard it as fully settled that a person whose private interests coincide with 
the public interest in government antitrust litigation is nonetheless not 
bound by the eventuality of such litigation, and hence may not, as of right, 
intervene in it.”164  In the antitrust area in particular, the Court explained, 
“private and public actions were designed to be cumulative, not mutually 
exclusive,” because “[d]ifferent policy considerations govern each of 
these.”165  Moreover, when individual rights are at stake, “due-process 
questions may arise, such as whether citizens are entitled to notice and to 
exclude themselves and whether a process for distributing damages to 
individuals must be established.”166 
The harder cases are those where the character of the underlying action 
involves both public questions and private rights.  The Supreme Court has 
been enigmatic in this area.  Currently, as parens patriae, the state can seek 
compensation for sovereign or quasi-sovereign claims, but it must have an 
interest that is distinct from individual citizens’ interests.167  As courts have 
recognized, the Supreme Court has not defined “quasi-sovereign” 
interests,168 but “it is clear that a state may sue to protect its citizens against 
‘the pollution of the air over its territory; or of interstate waters in which the 
state has rights.’”169  Yet, states cannot “sue to assert the rights of private 
individuals.”170  Nevertheless, states do not limit their authority to well-
traveled “quasi-sovereign” interests like environmental and antitrust 
enforcement.  Rather, they have asserted their parens patriae authority with 
varying degrees of success in bringing litigation against tobacco 
 
 161. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 162. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. 
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 163. 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961). 
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companies,171 lead paint manufacturers,172 gun manufacturers, and health 
maintenance organizations.173 
Adequate representation and preclusion in these in-between cases—
where the underlying action involves both public questions and private 
rights—can be addressed by either limiting the scope of attorneys general’s 
parens patriae authority or by not precluding a subsequent citizen suit when 
the right in question is an individual harm and a structural conflict exists.   
First, the Court could clarify the scope of a state’s parens patriae 
authority.  By limiting the types of claims a state can assert on behalf of a 
private individual ex ante, the courts would likewise limit the preclusive 
force of those judgments.  If an attorney general could pursue only 
aggregate rights and she instead litigated claims involving individual harms, 
then the individual claims should not be precluded in a subsequent case. 
But several problems exist with limiting the attorneys general’s authority 
ex ante.  First, as Professor Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman have pointed 
out, the parens patriae action may be one of the last possibilities for 
enforcing consumer protection, antitrust, and employment laws in the wake 
of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes.174  As they advocate, attorneys general should “redress the injuries 
of consumers and employees who would otherwise have no recourse in a 
post-Concepcion world.”175 
Yet, even if attorneys general are allowed to collect damages on behalf of 
individuals, there is often no requirement that they distribute those damages 
to the affected citizens.176  As Gilles and Friedman note, “[l]iberal use of cy 
pres, escheatment to the public fisc, and the application of rough justice 
principles in distributing awards are unquestioned hallmarks of parens 
patriae litigation.”177  Consequently, limiting parens patriae authority to 
the pursuit of purely aggregate rights might strike a fair balance.  On one 
hand, it would allow the state to skirt arbitration provisions and class-
certification standards in enforcing aggregate rights, including those private 
interests that rise to a “quasi-sovereign” level when sufficiently 
 
 171. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962 (E.D. Tex. 1997); R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Richard P. 
Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and 
the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859 (2000). 
 172. E.g., State v. Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008) (explaining 
that the state could not pursue a public-nuisance claim against the defendants because it 
could not prove that the defendants “interfered with a public right”). 
 173. Ratliff, supra note 152, at 1847. 
 174. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 151, at 623. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 665 n.193 (citing, for example, California’s Cartwright Act which allows the 
attorney general to distribute monetary relief “[i]n any manner as the superior court . . . may 
authorize [so long as] . . . each person be afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure his or 
her appropriate portion of the monetary relief”). 
 177. Id. at 666. 
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aggregated.178  On the other, it would allow individuals to ride on the 
state’s coattails and perhaps even use offensive nonmutual issue preclusion 
to vindicate their individual rights.  The second remaining difficulty with 
this ex ante approach, however, is in defining the limits of parens patriae 
authority in a meaningful way, a problem that we will revisit in exploring 
the second potential solution. 
The second possibility for addressing these in-between cases involving 
public questions and private rights is to apply the aggregate-rights 
framework in assessing subsequent claims of inadequate representation.  
That is, where purely aggregate rights are concerned, the attorney general is 
presumed an adequate representative and courts should tolerate greater 
intragroup conflicts.179  But where individual rights are at stake, plaintiffs 
should have the chance to collaterally attack the judgment if a structural 
conflict existed, if the distribution of divisible remedies was inequitable, if 
the attorney general lacked a sufficient motive to pursue the case 
vigorously, or if the attorney general performed inadequately in prosecuting 
the case.180  This would allow attorneys general to continue to pursue a 
wide array of actions that might otherwise fall through the cracks in the 
wake of Dukes and Concepcion, but would preserve citizens’ individual 
right to sue where the harm or relief requested overlaps with private, 
individual rights and the attorney general’s representation fell short. 
To further explain, as the beginning of this section noted, the easy cases 
are those in which the underlying right is one with a predominately public 
character, such as implementing a wildlife-management statute or 
establishing public transit system fares.  To return to the notions of consent 
and interest representation, precluding subsequent litigation in cases 
involving aggregate rights satisfies both traditional theories.  Because most 
attorneys general are elected and must serve the public’s interest,181 consent 
might be satisfied through any number of social-contract theories focusing 
 
 178. Lemos, supra note 2, at 493. 
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on the consent of the governed such as John Locke’s tacit consent,182 
Immanuel Kant’s hypothetical consent,183 or even John Rawls’s notion of 
what we would agree to behind a veil of ignorance.184  Interests roughly 
align, too.  Serving the public interest is in the attorney general’s best 
interest––the press can easily keep tabs on public actions, ambitious 
attorneys general eyeing other elected positions must keep the public 
satisfied, and citizen stakeholders will complain openly if displeased.185 
But when attorneys general bring borderline cases involving “quasi-
sovereign” interests with public and private dimensions, we run into 
essentially the same problem that we faced with limiting the scope of the 
attorney general’s authority ex ante:  how to define aggregate rights.  The 
difference is that challenging the representation ex post has several benefits.  
First, it allows difficult procedural cases to proceed without the 
impediments created by class-certification standards or arbitration clauses.  
Second, it gives the attorney general an opportunity to pursue public 
questions and related private rights in tandem.  Third, if that representation 
proves lacking, particularly with regard to private rights, it gives citizens a 
chance to initiate those claims in a subsequent action.  Nevertheless, the 
chief concern is over what constitutes an aggregate right.  Here we can rely 
again on the basic aggregate-rights framework laid out in Part II.A to 
differentiate between aggregate and individual harms. 
Punitive damages once again provide an illustrative example.  Instead of 
examining them in the Title VII context, however, consider their role in the 
tobacco litigation brought by multiple states’ attorneys general.  After a 
number of states’ attorneys general sued the tobacco companies for 
violating various consumer-protection laws, engaging in deceptive and 
misleading conduct that wronged the public, unjustly enriching themselves 
with taxpayer money that went to treat smokers’ health problems, and 
wrongfully profiting at the public’s expense,186 they reached a master 
settlement agreement.  The settlement contained a broad release that 
covered claims by states acting as parens patriae as well as private 
attorneys general and taxpayers to “the extent that any such person or entity 
is seeking relief on behalf of or generally applicable to the general public 
. . . as opposed to solely private or individual relief for separate and distinct 
injuries.”187  It defined “released claims” to include “liabilities of any 
nature including civil penalties and punitive damages.”188  So, when private 
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parties later sued for compensatory and punitive damages, the tobacco 
companies claimed that punitive damages remedied a public harm and were 
thus precluded.189 
Not surprisingly, courts considering individuals’ subsequent tobacco 
lawsuits reached conflicting opinions over whether punitive damages were 
a matter of public interest and thus remedied an aggregate harm.190  These 
conflicts centered principally on each state’s punitive damage law.  On one 
hand, some courts have reasoned that their state law uses punitive damages 
to deter wrongful conduct, punish misbehavior for the public good, and thus 
benefit the general public, not private parties.191  As one court observed in 
response to a plaintiff’s claim that she retained “some private interest in 
punitive damages,” that argument “conflicts with the purpose of punitive 
damages in New York, since ‘enforcement of an award of punitive damages 
as a purely private remedy would violate strong public policy.’”192  In that 
sense, punitive damages do not remedy an individual harm; instead, they 
punish wrongdoers and deter others from engaging in that conduct—
remedies designed to protect the public as a whole.  This concept is further 
reflected in certain state statutes that require a percentage of punitive 
damages awarded to go to the state’s treasury193 as well as by some states’ 
criteria that plaintiffs demonstrate “grave misconduct affecting the public 
generally” as opposed to just an “individually sustained wrong.”194 
Other states have reached the opposite conclusion when faced with the 
same question of whether the tobacco settlement precludes subsequent 
individual punitive damage claims.  California, for instance, uses a 
“primary rights” test in assessing res judicata, which means that courts 
examine the harm suffered and bar subsequent actions only when they arise 
out of “the same injury to the same right.”195  In the tobacco cases, an 
individual’s punitive damage claim arises out of her own personal and 
emotional injuries, not the economic harms and anticompetitive activities 
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that the attorney general pursued as parens patriae.196  Thus, punitive 
damage claims arise out of a plaintiff’s individual harm. 
These two distinct approaches to characterizing punitive damage claims 
should likewise lead to alternative results if a citizen claimed that the 
attorney general inadequately represented her in pursuing that claim.  When 
punitive damages benefit the public as a whole by deterring wrongful 
conduct and punishing wrongdoers, an individual’s subsequent claim that 
the attorney general inadequately represented her in litigating that remedy 
should fall on deaf ears.  In this instance, courts should measure the 
representation’s fairness in group terms since punitive damages are 
unindividuated among group members.  Representation would be 
inadequate only if the attorney general colluded with the defendant, failed 
to zealously prosecute the claim, or otherwise injured the group qua group.   
Conversely, if California had not decided to prohibit preclusion of 
punitive damages ex ante—through its definition of primary rights—then it 
might reach the same result using the aggregate-rights framework.  For 
example, if punitive damages compensated individual victims of an 
aggregate harm, the attorney general could still request them (and distribute 
them among the victims), but citizens would have more latitude and a larger 
arsenal to demonstrate inadequate representation.  Consequently, an 
individual could relitigate punitive damages if a structural conflict existed, 
if the monetary distribution was inequitable, if the attorney general lacked a 
sufficient motive to zealously litigate the case, or if the attorney general 
failed to competently prosecute the lawsuit. 
B.  Multidistrict Litigation 
The circumstances of multidistrict litigation create unusual litigation 
relationships that serve to complicate inadequate representation claims.  The 
first relationship is between the attorney and the client, a seemingly 
traditional pairing based on consent through a retainer agreement.  Yet, 
attorneys typically represent many clients with roughly similar claims 
against the same defendant to capitalize on economies of scale and recoup 
their litigation investment.197  That means that the traditional attorney-client 
relationship, where the client monitors her attorney’s performance is a 
fiction; her fate is tied to that of many others and learning her own lawsuit’s 
status tells her little about how the litigation as a whole is faring.  The 
second, even more attenuated relationship is between the client and the 
plaintiffs’ steering committee—the court-appointed attorneys who direct 
and control the litigation for efficiency’s sake.  The final relationship is 
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between the directly retained attorneys and the plaintiffs’ steering 
committee, a relationship that this Article does not consider.198 
1.  Attorney-Client Relationship 
Because the first relationship, between the attorney and her clients, is far 
more attenuated in the context of multidistrict litigation than a conventional 
attorney-client relationship and the attorney represents many clients who 
may have conflicting interests, there is a real potential for inadequate 
representation.  As Part II.A explained, in a mass-tort case, just as in an 
individual-rights case, a plaintiff could prove her underlying malpractice 
claim without referencing other plaintiffs.  Likewise, no question exists as 
to who receives the remedy:  the individual plaintiff.  Yet, because of the 
tendency toward centralization,199 a subsequent inadequate representation 
claim (though it tends to take the form of a direct attack via attorney 
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty,200 a bar complaint, or even criminal 
conspiracy to commit fraud201) is more likely to rely on evidence of how 
the attorney treated other clients as proof of malfeasance. 
Because this representation falls into the middle of the spectrum of 
individual versus aggregate rights, it cannot be explained wholly by consent 
or interest representation.  Although clients must give their informed 
consent when attorneys represent multiple claimants in the same litigation, 
as I have explored in detail elsewhere, they are sometimes unable to obtain 
any meaningful information about potential conflicts until a settlement offer 
is on the table.202  And though the attorney must act in the best interests of 
the group as a whole, that could mean sacrificing one client’s interest to 
further the others’.203 
Nevertheless, because clients individually retain their attorneys, consent 
remains the operating principle.  Accordingly, most proposals for rectifying 
inadequate representation focus on shoring up consent at the beginning of 
the litigation process rather than mending the preclusive effect of a 
judgment ex post.  Because I have proposed several reforms in previous 
articles, I will simply mention them here alongside other commentators’ 
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ideas to situate them in the context of this aggregate-rights framework.  
Ideas for bolstering informed consent include providing market solutions 
that allow third-party financiers to play the role of an informed 
intermediary;204 coaxing attorneys to identify conflicts at the litigation’s 
outset and either limiting the size or diversity of their clients or supplying 
better information to them;205 encouraging the judge to decipher internal 
conflicts and appoint alternative counsel when the circumstances warrant 
it;206 and improving communication between the court and the litigants as 
well as between the litigants themselves.207  In addition, there have been 
proposals that would allow attorneys to embed a voting clause in clients’ 
retainer agreements, which would bind all clients to a settlement if a 
substantial majority agreed to it.208  Others have proposed utilizing 
intraclaimant governance agreements, which would allow the clients to 
create a similar voting structure after they have the opportunity to 
communicate with one another and determine if substantial conflicts exist 
between them.209  Both of these latter proposals include a judicial failsafe, 
albeit with varying degrees of protection.210 
2.  Client–Lead Attorney Relationships 
Although consent dominates the relationship between attorneys and their 
directly retained clients, the same cannot be said for the relationship 
between plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ steering committee or other lead 
lawyers.  No individual attorney-client relationship exists between the lead 
attorneys and most plaintiffs in a multidistrict litigation, so plaintiffs have 
no say in who is appointed and no way to fire or discipline those who act 
contrary to their interests.211  As Professors Silver and Miller have 
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observed, “[j]udges appoint the lawyers who run MDLs on the plaintiffs’ 
side” but “[t]heir choices can be puzzling:”212 
[J]udges sometimes give lead positions to lawyers with few or no clients 
in an MDL, passing over other lawyers whose clients number in the 
hundreds or thousands.  Judges also wield the appointment power with 
unfettered discretion.  They need not explain why they choose some 
lawyers rather than others, and rarely do.  They face no known risk of 
appellate review or reversal:  no appointment decision seems ever to have 
been challenged, much less reversed.213 
The settlements that usually result from multidistrict litigation are likewise 
unassailable since they rely on plaintiffs’ consent, however coerced it may 
be.214 
The insular nature of these lead-counsel assignments is not healthy for 
judicial legitimacy.  Neither consent215 nor identity of interests currently 
justifies these appointments.  Despite having a fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiffs, when an attorney assumes a lead role in a multidistrict litigation 
and has no actual clients involved in the case, the attorney is likely to feel 
beholden to the judge.216  Certain attorneys gain reputations for building 
consensus, making trouble, or being patsies.  If a judge feels that the lead 
attorneys are not moving settlement discussions along quickly enough,217 
then she is not likely to bestow lead positions upon those attorneys in the 
future and may well communicate their “failings” to other multidistrict 
litigation judges.  Moreover, lead attorneys’ obligations are far from 
concrete.218  Although courts have remarked that lead counsel represent “all 
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plaintiffs”219 or “owe[] a duty to plaintiffs”220 and commentators have 
argued that they are fiduciaries to the claimants,221 even if those 
propositions were unassailable, they would tell us little about how lead 
attorneys should approach intragroup conflicts. 
Because inadequate representation claims are impractical given the 
impossibility of appellate review and plaintiffs “consent” to a settlement,222 
one key reform is needed––judges should issue a reasoned opinion 
appointing attorneys to lead-counsel positions based on their alignment with 
identifiable interests among the plaintiff class.  In particular, judges should 
look for “structural conflicts.”  That is, a conflict of interest either between 
the “claimants and the lawyers who would represent claimants on an 
aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that would present a 
significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the 
conduct of the litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on 
grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to 
disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.”223 If a 
structural conflict exists or arises during the litigation, the court should 
ensure that the subgroup has its own representative on the plaintiffs’ 
steering committee. 
Even though the inevitability of settlement makes the prospect of 
appealing the order slim, it still has several advantages.  An order forces the 
judge to explain her selection rationale, consider what potential intragroup 
conflicts might exist, appoint counsel to represent those competing interests 
(much like an attorney would represent a subclass in a class action), and 
create a record, should allegations of inadequate representation by lead 
counsel subsequently arise.  Moreover, the opinion-writing process itself 
acts as a check on decision making:  if the reasoning seems dubious when 
articulated on paper, then perhaps the judge will reconsider.224 
Assuming this change is in place and that a plaintiff is able to have the 
opinion reviewed by an appellate court—all very difficult assumptions 
given the inevitability of settlement—how should the appellate court 
consider these individual challenges?  After all, simply claiming that the 
plaintiffs’ steering committee has a duty to represent all plaintiffs fails to 
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account for the very real likelihood of conflicts.  For example, although it 
proceeded as a class action, multidistrict litigation claimants might face 
similar conflicts to those in the Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc. heart valve 
settlement.225  In discussing Bowling, Professor Jay Tidmarsh explained, 
“Those in immediate need of [a heart-valve removal] were unlikely to 
benefit from the research and development fund, and might well have 
preferred higher payments for [removal] costs,” yet “[n]o special 
representation was provided.”226  If a situation like this—where claimants 
required immediate heart-valve removal—presented itself in multidistrict 
litigation and no lead lawyer specifically represented those claimants’ 
unique interests when negotiating an aggregate settlement, those plaintiffs 
could feel they were inadequately represented. 
This is where the aggregate-rights framework can play a role.  In general, 
multidistrict litigations that are not certified as class actions involve 
individual as opposed to aggregate rights.227  Nevertheless, in the context of 
the heart-valve hypothetical, a claim that the steering committee 
inadequately represented a heart-valve removal plaintiff would have group-
based characteristics in that it could not be proven without referencing the 
representation of other plaintiffs.  Yet, counsel cannot disprove the claim 
simply by showing that she treated the rest of the group fairly.  Moreover, 
not all claimants are harmed equally by the inadequate representation; some 
benefit.  Consequently, the harm is to the individual and the court should 
assess the representation using the more generous structural conflicts 
inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
As litigants move away from conventional aggregation through class 
actions, questions about adequate representation and preclusion have 
proliferated.  This confusion is due in part to a muddled, historical thesis for 
group litigation.  Even the class action does not always make sense in terms 
of consent and identity of interests.  Consequently, this Article has 
endeavored to construct a practical framework that courts can use to address 
inadequate representation across a variety of aggregate litigation forms—
from traditional class actions to parens patriae cases to multidistrict 
litigation.   
This aggregate-rights framework recommends that subsequent courts 
evaluate claims of unfair, inadequate representation differently, depending 
on whether the underlying substantive right is aggregate or individual.  
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When group litigation adjudicates individual rights, the collectivization is 
merely a tool for convenience and efficiency; it does not change the nature 
of the underlying right into a group right.  Consequently, the individual 
must either consent to the conflict (when counsel represents many 
individuals collectively) or the court must take measures to prevent 
structural conflicts.  If neither condition is fulfilled, then, on collateral 
attack, courts should evaluate inadequate representation claims to determine 
whether there was a “significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might 
skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some 
claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their 
respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers 
themselves.”228 
In contrast, when aggregate rights are at stake, affected individuals 
should receive notice and the opportunity to voice their opinions about how 
the court should fashion a remedy.  When the underlying claim accrues 
from an aggregate harm, if counsel inadequately represented one group 
member, then she failed not just one member, but the whole group.  
Because each group member benefits from (or is harmed by) indivisible 
relief equally, no member has the right to an independent judgment.229  It 
likewise makes sense that when counsel or a class representative bungles 
that effort, the group experiences inadequate representation equally.230  
Thus, courts should and do tolerate greater conflicts among group members 
in these situations.  Successful inadequate representation claims tend to be 
those where the lawyers and, potentially, the named representatives acted 
contrary to the whole group’s best interests or tried to represent an 
overinclusive group in which some would require an alternative remedy 
that the representative had no self-interested reason to litigate. 
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